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Where the Grass is Greener: Comparing 
Green Party Success in National 





Why do Green parties perform better in European Parliament (EP) elections than 
in national parliament elections? Even in countries that use proportionally representative 
voting systems for both national and EP elections, many Green parties gained more than 
twice the proportion of EP seats in 2019 compared to the previous national election. Using 
national and EP election results, European Social Survey data, and Eurobarometer polling 
from the 2019 EP election, I test competing theories of Green party success. As EP voter 
issues become more salient and more voters believe that their vote matters to EU policy, I 
find that the “second-order election” effect is less relevant. Surprisingly, I also find that the 
Greens are the only small party family that consistently gained more representation in the 
EP. Different voter priorities and party issue framing, for both environmental and pro-EU 
issues, boosted the Green vote in the 2019 EP election.
Keywords
Green parties, European Parliament, proportional representation, elections, voting
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1. Introduction
The most recent European Parliament (EP) election, in May 2019, saw a dramatic 
surge in the number of seats won by Green Parties across Europe. Winning nearly 10% of 
votes, the Greens/European Free Alliance group became the fourth-largest party group 
in the EP (Graham-Harrison, 2019). The Greens’ increased representation gives them the 
potential to act as kingmakers within the EP and demand climate action, such as the Euro-
pean Green Deal—a plan to make the EU climate neutral by 2050—that President of the 
European Commission Ursula von der Leyen promised in the EP in July 2019 (Tagliapietra, 
2019). The rise of European Green Parties should be understood in the context of a shift 
away from mainstream big-tent parties towards smaller niche parties throughout Europe. 
The Greens, who prioritize the post-materialist values of environmentalism, anti-militarism, 
anti-discrimination, and social justice, are on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum 
from the right-wing populist parties which also increased their seats in the 2019 EP election. 
Yet both party groups champion ideological platforms focused on niche issues—environ-
mentalism or immigration—to which traditional mainstream parties have failed to respond 
(Berman, 2019). Understanding why niche issue parties are growing at the expense of main-
stream parties is crucial to understanding the party realignment currently taking place within 
Europe’s democracies. While this dynamic has generated significant interest at the national 
level, it is comparatively understudied on the supranational EU level.
Why do European Green parties do better in European Parliament elections than in 
national parliamentary elections? In the 2019 EP election, many Green parties won twice 
the proportion of seats that they won in the most recent preceding national election. This 
disparity between Green voting at the national and European levels indicates that party 
choice is not fixed for voters. Party behavior, different institutional structures, and the per-
ceived importance of elections matter in predicting vote switching. Several theories have 
been put forward to explain the different electoral outcomes in national and EP elections, 
including EP elections being perceived as unimportant compared to national politics, vot-
ers engaging in “sincere” rather than tactical voting, different framings of issues between 
elections, and Green voting as a signal of pro-EU preferences. This paper examines each of 
these theories in turn, using data from electoral results, the European Social Survey, Euro-
barometer polling, and party manifestos, to determine the extent to which they hold true. 
Ultimately, I find that Green success in EP elections is the result of changes in behavior by 
both voters and parties. Voters with a “sincere” preference for the Greens are more likely 
to vote Green in EP elections even if they tactically vote for a larger mainstream party in 
national elections. Green parties highlight different issues in national and EP campaigns, 
focusing more on environmentalism and pro-EU integration policies for EP campaigns.
2. Cases
The phenomenon of greater Green representation in the EP occurs across EU mem-
ber states, although it is most common in northern and western Europe, perhaps because 
climate change is a lower priority in eastern Europe (Ashdown, 2019). This presents an 
interesting puzzle: given the characterization of Green voters as ideologically motivated, we 
might expect them to vote for the party with which they most closely align—the Greens 
—in all elections. Additionally, higher effective electoral thresholds for EP elections in many 
countries, due to the small number of EP seats available, should result in the underrepresen-
tation of small parties like the Greens.
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One possible explanation of this puzzle is that different electoral institutions for na-
tional and EP elections result in different outcomes. For example, the French Green Party 
won 13 out of 79 seats elected from a single national constituency in the 2019 EP election 
but won only 1 of 577 single-member district seats in the 2017 National Assembly election. 
To fairly compare national and EP elections for this paper, I focus on the 16 EU member 
states that use proportionally representative electoral institutions for both national and EP 
elections and which have a Green Party that won seats in either of the most recent national 
legislature or EP elections. I define Green Parties as parties that are full members of the Eu-
ropean Green Party (EGP). Although non-EGP members sit with the Group of the Greens/ 
European Free Alliance in the EP, I consider that only EGP members are ideologically simi-
lar enough to compare on the national and European levels. These 16 member states, the 
seats held by their Green parties in national parliament and EP elections, and the effective 
electoral thresholds for these elections, can be found in Table 1.
 
Table 1. National and European Green Party Representation
Member 
State
Party Name National 
Legislature (Lower 
House) seats 






















7/179 3.9% 2% (national) 2/14 14.29% 5.0%
Finland Vihreät - 
De Gröna





67/709 9.45% 5% (national) 21/96 21.88% 0.75%
Ireland Irish Green 
Party
2/158 1.27% 12.5%-18.8% 
(constituency)
2/11 18.18% 15.0% - 
18.8%
Sweden Miljöpartiet de 
gröna
16/349 4.58% 4% (national), 
9% (constituency)
2/20 10.00% 3.6%
Bulgaria Zelenite 0/240 0.00% 4.7%-15% 
(constituency)
1/17 5.88% 4.2%
Luxembourg Déi Gréng 9/60 15.00% 3.2%-9.4% 
(constituency)
1/6 16.67% 10.7%
Netherlands GroenLinks 14/150 9.33% 0.48% (national) 3/26 11.54% 2.8%
Spain Iniciativa per 
Catalunya Verdsc








Austria Die Grünen 23/183 13.1% 4% (national) 2/18 11.11% 4.0%
Belgium ECOLOb 13/150 8.67% 5% (national), 
4%-12.5% 
(constituency)
2/21 9.52% 8.3% 
(French)
Belgium GROENb 6/150 4.00% 5% (national), 
3%-5.8% (con-
stituency)





2/230 0.87% 1.5%-25.0% 
(constituency)
0/21 0.00% 3.4%
Where the Grass is Greener
8 6 Naomi Tilles  Pomona College
Member 
State
Party Name National 
Legislature (Lower 
House) seats 




















Cyprus Cyprus Green 
Party




Hungary Lehet Más a 
Politika / LMP
6/199 3.02% 5% (national) 0/21 0.00% 3.4%
Latvia Latvijas Zala 
Partija / LZP
6/100 6.00% 5% (national) 0/8 0.00% 8.3%
Source: European Parliament (2019); Schulmeister, Chiesa, Friedli, Tsoulou Malakoudi, & 
Büttner (2019)
Table 1 Notes:
a For national elections with multi-member districts, and for the EP elections, I approximated the electoral threshold using 
Lijphart’s (1999, p.153) formula T=75%/(M+1) where M is the district magnitude. I used the official national electoral 
threshold where adjustment seats were allocated to ensure proportionality.
b In Belgium’s EP election, ECOLO won 1/8 French-speaking seats and 1/1 German-speaking seat. GROEN won 1/12 
Dutch-speaking seats.
c Both Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds and EQUO were elected as members of left-wing electoral coalitions with other parties.
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Ireland have much higher Green repre-
sentation in the EP than in national legislatures. Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, 
and Spain also have higher EP representation. Austria, Belgium, Poland, and Portugal show 
little or no difference between EP and national Green representation, while Cyprus, Hun-
gary, and Latvia have more Green representation in the national legislature. However, in 
Poland, Portugal, Cyprus, Hungary, and Latvia the proportion of Green votes in the na-
tional elections would be insufficient to clear the higher effective electoral threshold for EP 
elections. In Austria, the Die Grünen party actually received the same vote share (14%) in 
the EP election and the national election, even though it won a larger proportion of seats in 
the national legislature (Eddy, 2019) (European Parliament, 2019). 
To test my hypotheses, I use data from the five member states with the most sig-
nificant difference between national and EP representation: Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, and Sweden. These cases illustrate the puzzle of Green representation especially 
well because their Green parties all have over 50% more representation in the EP compared 
to the lower house of the national legislature. Additionally, these member states represent 
the EU’s diversity of proportionally representative electoral systems: all elect representa-
tives from multi-member districts but use slightly different systems. Denmark, Finland, and 
Sweden use a party list system, with Denmark and Sweden also allocating additional “adjust-
ment seats” to ensure national proportionality (Valmyndigheten Sweden, 2018; Folketinget 
Denmark, n.d.). Germany uses a mixed member proportional formula where voters select 
individual candidates as well as parties to ensure proportionality (A.K., 2013), and Ireland 
elects representatives using the Single Transferable Vote (Lijphart, 1999).
3. Literature Review
The growing success of Green parties across Europe in recent years has prompted 
investigation into how and why they are gaining votes. Green parties generally do well in 
societies with post-materialist conflicts caused by high levels of wealth or the presence of a 
tangible environmental dispute (Grant & Tilley, 2019). Green party voters not only share a 
set of attitudes, but also several specific social characteristics: they are typically young, highly 
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educated, urban, and less attached to traditional churches (Dolezal, 2010). The increase of 
potential Green voters in post-materialist societies, combined with a rise in tangible envi-
ronmental issues, may explain the rise in overall support for Green parties. However, these 
studies fail to explain the discrepancy between Green success at the national and European 
levels.
One explanation for why EP elections have different outcomes compared to national 
elections is that EP elections are “second-order elections.” Reif and Schmitt (1980) propose 
that second-order elections are viewed as non-decisive, where the electorate perceives there 
to be “less at stake.” Their theory claims that when there is more at stake, i.e., in first-order 
national elections, voters will strategically opt for a more powerful party that supports the 
general direction of their political views rather than a niche party that will have minimal in-
fluence in government. The second-order dimension of EP elections provides opportunities 
for small and new parties because they gain voters whose true preference lies with the small 
or new party but who support a larger established party in the first-order election. Govern-
ment parties are also likely to lose votes in EP elections because support for the government 
has often declined since the national election, or voters may vote for the opposition to apply 
pressure on the governing party (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). This leads to my first hypothesis:
H1: Voters are less likely to engage in strategic voting in EP elections so small 
parties will gain vote share at the expense of larger parties, especially the ruling 
party or coalition.
A more nuanced version of the second-order election theory holds that there are 
different motivations for vote switching: “sincere voting”—changing behavior due to ideo-
logical differences on the European level, and “protest voting”—changing behavior to send 
a signal of disapproval to a party or government on the national level. Examining the 2004 
EP election, Hobolt and Spoon (2012) found that the magnitude effect of sincere and pro-
test motivations were remarkably similar on the likelihood of vote switching or abstaining. 
Because “sincere voting” is not accounted for in H1, this leads to my second hypothesis:
H2: More voters have a “sincere” preference for Green parties than actually vote 
for Green parties in first-order national elections.
A third explanation for vote switching to Green Parties is that voters’ policy prefer-
ences for the European Parliament motivate voting. Carrubba and Timpone (2005), in 
their study of the 1994 EP election, established that vote switching to Green parties was 
consistent with the second-order election theory. However, they also found that “at least 
some of the electorate is demonstrating a tendency to cast votes because of how the EP 
may influence policy outcomes in the future” (Carrubba & Timpone, 2005). They recon-
cile these competing explanations by suggesting that the EP is becoming an increasingly 
important legislative body, so elections are no longer considered exclusively second-order. 
Instead, voters consider their policy preferences, which may differ between the national and 
European levels of government. If voters are motivated by EP policy outcomes, we should 
expect Green issues to have greater salience on the EU level, or Greens to run on different 
campaign issues in national and EP elections. The Greens’ central issue of environmentalism 
may be more salient to voters on the supranational level, especially because the EU now 
plays an important role in setting environmental policy for its member states. For example, 
the EU has the power to fine member states for failure to meet their binding 2030 emissions 
targets (O’Sullivan, 2019). This leads to my third hypothesis:
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H3: Voters prioritize different issues in the EP as compared to their national 
legislatures.
The increasing politicization of the question of European integration and even the 
EU’s existence may also motivate Green votes in EP elections as a signaling mechanism of 
voters’ pro-EU ideology. In the context of EU polarization, Green parties have differenti-
ated themselves from other parties which offer “piecemeal reforms” by “making a strong 
case for full supranational democracy and for moving away from national vetoes” (Sorace, 
2019). Hobolt and Spoon (2012) observed that the increased politicization of the ques-
tion of the EU influenced vote choice. However, the effect of EU politicization on vote 
switching is disputed. Schmitt & Toygür’s (2016) analysis of the 2014 EP election indicated 
that EU policy was not significant to the election results, and “the politicization of Euro-
pean Union politics did not really discourage the predictions of the second-order model” 
(Schmitt & Toygür, 2016). This dispute is especially relevant to more recent EP elections, 
when the issue of European integration and pooled sovereignty was highly politicized in 
many countries. In the leadup to the 2019 election, Frans Timmermans, the first vice presi-
dent of the European Commission, predicted that the vote would be a battle for “the very 
soul of Europe” (Schaart, 2018). This leads to my fourth hypothesis:
H4: Increased political polarization over the future of the EU motivates Green 
voting in EP elections.
4. Data and Methods
To test the second-order election hypothesis, I compare the proportions of seats won 
by all parties which ran candidates in the 2019 EP election and the previous national elec-
tion held between the 2014 and 2019 EP elections. If the second-order election theory 
holds true, I expect representation to increase for all small parties, not only the Greens. I 
also expect representation of large parties, especially those in government, to decrease in 
the EP election.
To test the “sincere” vote switching (Hobolt & Spoon, 2012) hypothesis, I examine 
European Social Survey data on “party voted for in the last election” and “which party feel 
closer to” (ESS Round 7, 2014; ESS Round 8). This data is available for Sweden, Finland, 
Germany, and Ireland from 2016, and for Denmark from 2014. I also compare the reported 
percentage of votes for Green parties to the actual vote share Greens received in the previ-
ous election. If voters only express their “sincere” preferences in second-order elections, 
more respondents should feel closer to the Greens than voted for them in national elections.
To test the “different issue preferences” hypothesis, I analyze campaign materials from 
Green parties in national and EP elections in Ireland and Finland. Because Ireland and 
Finland are “new destination” countries that were not affected by the 2015 migrant crisis 
to the same extent as Germany, Sweden, and Denmark, migration should not skew issue 
importance in their elections. I examine which issues were emphasized by Green parties in 
the national and EP elections and analyze Eurobarometer data collected during the 2019 EP 
election to determine which issues were most important to voters. 
To test the hypothesis that voters signal their support for the EU by voting Green, I 
use data from the ESS on belief that “European unification should go further” as a proxy 
to measure support for the EU and movement towards supranational democracy. If this 
hypothesis holds true, I expect respondents who want greater European integration to be 
more likely to vote Green due to Green parties’ explicit pro-EU stance. I do not include 
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data on Denmark for this hypothesis because the most recent ESS data is from 2014 and 
would therefore correspond to the 2014 EP election. I also use Eurobarometer survey data 
from the 2019 EP election to identify what factors motivated voters to vote in the election.
5. Analysis
5.1. Second-Order Elections
Across the five countries, there was no strong trend of vote switching in favor of small 
parties in the EP election. In Denmark (Table 2), the large center-left Socialdemokratiet 
party won less representation in the EP than in the Folketing, and the right-wing populist 
Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party) suffered a dramatic loss. The large conservative 
Venstre party, however, increased its representation. The Green SF party and the social-
liberal Radikale Venstre parties both achieved over three times their national representation 
in the EP. Although these parties are both relatively small, other small parties did not experi-
ence a difference in representation between the national and European levels. The most sig-
nificant similarity is that both the SF and Radikale Venstre parties are left-wing and pro-EU. 
However, the Alternativet party is also left-wing and pro-EU and did not win any EP seats.
Table 2. Denmark National Legislature and EP Election Results
Party % of Folketing seats 
in 18 June 2015 
election
% of EP seats 




Dansk Folkeparti 20.7% 7.7%
Det Radikale Venstre 4.5% 15.4%
Socialistisk Folkeparti / SFa 3.9% 15.4%
“Enhedslisten de Rød-Grønne” 7.8% 7.7%
Det Konservative Folkeparti 3.4% 7.7%
Alternativet 5.0% 0%
Liberal Alliance 7.3% 0%
a Green Party 
Source: Schulmeister et al. (2019)
In Finland (Table 3), the 2019 EP and national elections occurred within six weeks 
of each other. The Social Democratic Party and right-wing populist Perussuomalaiset party 
both lost representation in the EP election, while the center-right Kansallinen Kokoomus 
party, Green Vihreät - De Gröna, and social-liberal Svenska Folkpartiet all increased their 
representation in the EP compared to the national parliament. Some large parties won 
comparatively less representation in the EP, but other large, medium, and small parties were 
more successful in the 2019 EP election than they had been in the previous national elec-
tion.
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Table 3. Finland National Legislature and EP Election Results
Party % of Parliament seats 
in 14 April 2019 election
% of EP seats 
in 26 May 2019 EP election
SDP 20% 15.4%
Perussuomalaiset 19.5% 15.4%
Kansallinen Kokoomus 19% 23.1%
Suomen Keskusta 15.5% 15.4%
Vihreät - De Grönaa 10% 15.4%
Vasemmistoliitto 8% 7.8%
Svenska folkpartiet 4.5% 7.8%
Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit 2.5% 0%
Sininen tulevaisuus 0% 0%
Piraattipuolue 0% 0%
  a Green Party / Source: Schulmeister et al. (2019)
In Sweden (Table 4), most parties won about the same proportion of seats in the 2018 
Riksdag and 2019 EP elections, excluding the Green Miljöpartiet de Gröna. There was 
some variation in small party representation, but there were both increases and decreases in 
representation between elections. In Germany (Table 5), most large parties lost representa-
tion in the 2019 EP election compared to their seats won in the 2017 Bundestag election, 
except for the Green Bündnis 90/Die Grünen party. Several small parties that did not clear 
the five percent national electoral threshold in the 2017 Bundestag election won seats in the 
2019 EP election, but this is likely a result of the lower effective electoral threshold rather 
than widespread vote switching. In Ireland (Table 6), the governing Fine Gael party actually 
gained a higher proportion of seats than it won in the 2016 Dáil election. The Green Party 
also dramatically increased its representation, as did the small Independents 4 Change party. 
However, all other small and medium parties decreased their proportion of seats between 
the 2016 Dáil election and 2019 EP election.
Table 4. Sweden National Legislature and EP Election Results
Party % of Riksdag seats 
in 9 September 2018 election
% of EP seats 









Feministiskt Initiativ 0% 0%
a Green Party / Source: Schulmeister et al. (2019)
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Table 5. Germany National Legislature and EP Election Results
Party % of Bundestag seats 
in 24 September 2017 
election
% of EP seats 





Bündnis 90/Die Grünena 9.4% 21.9%
SDP 21.6% 16.7%
AfD 13.5% 11.5%
DIE LINKE 9.7% 5.2%
FDP 11.3% 5.2%
Die PARTEI 0% 2.1%







b The CDU and CSU ran as a bloc in the 2019 EP election
             Source: Schulmeister et al. (2019)
Table 6. Ireland National Legislature and EP Election Results
Party % of Dáil seats 
in 26 February 2016 
election
% of EP seats 
in 24 May 2019 
EP election
Fine Gael 31.0% 36.4%
Green Partya 1.3% 18.2%
Independents 4 Change 2.5% 18.2%
Fianna Fáil 27.8% 9.1%
Sinn Féin 14.6% 9.1%
Labour Party 4.4% 0%
Social Democrats 1.9% 0%
a Green Party
Source: Schulmeister et al. (2019)
These data challege Reif and Schmitt’s second-order election theory. Instead of con-
sistent vote switching in favor of small parties, vote switching benefited and hurt both small 
and large parties. Green parties are the only party family which experienced an increase 
in representation in the EP election compared to the previous national election in all five 
countries. Government parties tended to win fewer seats in EP elections (Ireland is the ex-
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ception) but this change was usually small. These data clearly demonstrate that the Green 
Party vote switching phenomenon is unique to the Greens and not a feature of all small 
parties.
5.2. Sincere Voting
In all five cases, as shown in Table 7, ESS respondents were more likely to select their 
national Green Party as the party they “feel closer to” than as the party they voted for in the 
last election (ESS Round 7, 2014; ESS Round 8, 2016). 
Table 7. % of ESS Respondents That Voted for the Green Party in the Last Election 
and % That “Feel Closer to” the Green Party, 2014 and 2016 
Country % Voted for Greens 
in last election
% Feel closer to Greens
Finland (2016) 12.7% 18.9%
Sweden (2016) 8.3% 8.8%
Germany (2016) 10.7% 14.5%
Ireland (2016) 2.0% 3.4%
Denmark (2014) 8.9% 9.2%
               Source: ESS Round 7 (2014), ESS Round 8 (2016)
However, the percentage of respondents who reported voting for the Greens in the 
last election was generally higher than the actual vote share the Greens received in those 
elections. In Finland, the Greens won 8.5% of votes in the 2015 general election, in Swe-
den they won 6.9% of votes in the 2014 general election, in Germany they won 8.4% in 
the 2013 general election, and in Ireland they won 2.7% in the 2016 general election. In 
Denmark, for which the latest ESS data available is from 2014, the Greens won 5.6% in the 
2013 local elections and 9.2% in the 2011 general election. This disparity between reported 
voting and actual voting may be a result of the ESS’s small sample size (between 1,500 and 
2,900 respondents for each of the countries). Because the ESS question does not specify to 
which “last election” it refers, there could also be variation in responses referring to national, 
local, or even European elections. The voting disparity could also be a result of respondents’ 
tendency to overreport normative behavior (Brenner & DeLamater, 2016). Because voters 
“feel closer to” the Green Party, they likely view voting for the Greens as normatively good, 
and therefore may report voting for the Greens even if they voted for a different party in 
the last election.
Hobolt and Spoon’s (2012) theory that voters do not always vote according to their 
“sincere” preferences in first-order national elections is supported by these data. Given that 
Green Parties’ actual vote share was less than the ESS reported voting, the disparity between 
“sincere” party preference and actual voting is even larger than suggested by the ESS data. 
Green Parties have a distinct socio-cultural constituency of young, highly educated voters 
who work as social-cultural specialists or are students, are predominantly urban, and are 
less attached to Christian churches (Dolezal, 2010). This constituency’s structural position 
within post-materialist European societies informs their environmental, libertarian, and pro-
immigration attitudes, and therefore their strong affinity with the Green party. However, 
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2021/iss1/10
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 9 3
even socio-culturally Green voters may not support Green Parties in national elections 
when the party is viewed as having betrayed its values in government, as was the case with 
the Irish Green Party in 2011 (Bale, 2013). Green parties’ small size and perceived insig-
nificance in governments may also influence Green voters to strategically vote for larger 
mainstream parties (Hobolt & Spoon, 2012).
5.3. Issue Voting
My third hypothesis is that voters prioritize different issues in the EP as compared to 
their national legislatures. For this analysis, I compare the 2019 EP election manifestos of 
the Irish and Finnish Green parties with those parties’ manifestos for the previous national 
elections. The results are summarized in Table 8 below.
Table 8. Issue Framing by the Irish and Finnish Green Parties in National and EP Elections
Country National Issues EP Issues
Ireland Domestic economic reform
Increasing social spending: 
   housing and public transport
Environmental protection
Renewing the promise of the EU
Environmental protection
Finland Stopping climate change
Education
Poverty and Inequality
Renewing the promise of the EU
Environmental protection and 
   sustainability
 For the 2016 national election, the Irish Green Party’s platform was focused on 
domestic economic reform and increased spending on social services. The key issues high-
lighted were the development of economic sectors, ensuring affordable housing, develop-
ing public transport, developing tourism, and environmental protection (Irish Green Party, 
2016). The 2016 election manifesto notably focuses on economic issues instead of explicitly 
environmental issues. In contrast, the Irish Green Party’s election manifesto for the 2019 EP 
elections frames the party as explicitly pro-EU. The first line of the “Our Vision” section of 
the manifesto states “The Green Party believes in Europe” (Irish Green Party, 2016). The 
manifesto directly refers to the challenges of “authoritarianism, racism, terrorism and the 
threat of further economic uncertainty” which weaken the EU. The party’s slogan for the 
election is “It is time to renew the promise of Europe.” This explicitly pro-EU language 
dominates the first pages of the manifesto, sending a strong signal that a vote for the Green 
Party is primarily a vote in favor of the EU. After this section, the first three issues high-
lighted are “the right to inherit a livable planet,” focusing on carbon, energy, and waste; 
“transport,” including a ban on fossil-fuel cars; and “protecting nature on land and at sea,” 
including forestry and fishing. The first economic issue comes on the 8th page of the mani-
festo, and even then is primarily centered on promoting a circular and green economy (Irish 
Green Party, 2019). 
In contrast to the Irish Green Party, Vihreät - De Gröna’s national election manifesto 
focuses on more traditionally “green” issues. Its top priorities are listed as “stopping climate 
change,” “building the best education system in the world,” “preventing poverty and in-
equality,” and “creating work and safety” (Vihreät - De Gröna, 2019a). The primary focus is 
on environmental protection, combined with appeals to the post-materialist values (Fager-
holm, 2016) of Green voters with education and equality policies. This manifesto is cer-
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tainly in line with the expected political preferences of the young, highly educated, urban, 
and non-religious (Dolezal, 2010) Green voter base. Like the Irish Green Party, Vihreät 
- De Gröna’s 2019 EP election manifesto primarily focuses on the party’s pro-EU position. 
It emphasizes that “Finland needs Europe” and that “Europe is needed more than ever” in 
the world (Vihreät - De Gröna, 2019b). The manifesto also frames the EU as a “promoter 
of climate change prevention [and] environmental protection” which can “[show] the way 
in building a sustainable future for the world.”  Like the 2019 national election manifesto, 
it appeals to the values of Green voters by referencing the need to combat the divisions of 
“disputes, closed borders, isolationism, hatred and prejudice” threatening the EU (Vihreät 
- De Gröna, 2019b). A vote for Vihreät - De Gröna is a vote both in favor of continued 
EU integration and expansion of power, and for environmental policies on the EU level. 
Interestingly, the EP election manifesto does not mention any of the economic or welfare 
issues discussed in the national elections manifesto.
In summary, different issues are emphasized in the national and European election 
manifestos of the Irish and Finnish Green parties. The national manifestos tend to focus on 
economic and social issues such as the local economy, employment, and education. The 
EP manifestos tend to focus on the more abstract and aspirational goals of renewing Euro-
pean unity and environmental protection. Because Green voters are ideological voters, the 
comparative ideological orthodoxy of the EP election manifestos may offer greater appeal. 
According to a Eurobarometer report commissioned by the European Parliament to survey 
voters after the 2019 EP election, “combating climate change and protecting the environ-
ment” was the top issue in the 2019 EP election for 37% of respondents across all EU coun-
tries and the most mentioned issue by respondents in Denmark, Sweden, Germany, and 
Finland, among other countries. When asked why they voted for their party of choice in 
the election, the most common answer was “their proposals on European issues were closest 
to your ideas or values” chosen by 43% of respondents, closely followed by “their proposals 
on national issues were closest to your ideas or values” chosen by 42% of respondents (Zalc, 
Becuwe, & Buruian, 2019). These data demonstrate that voters differentiate between par-
ties’ proposals on national and European issues, and slightly prioritized their European issue 
preferences when voting in the EP election.
Another important indicator of issue voting in this Eurobarometer report was voters’ 
belief that “their voice counts in the EU.” Contrary to the assumption of the second-order 
election model that EP elections are viewed as insignificant, the high rate of belief among 
European voters that their voice counts indicates that issues are important to voters because 
they believe they can influence the policy of the EP. This is especially true for Green vot-
ers: according to the report, “citizens for whom climate change and the future of the EU 
are decisive are more likely to believe they can make things change by voting” (Zalc et al., 
2019). Green party issues on the European level are clearly important to these voters, and 
the Greens’ stronger ideological appeal in its EP election manifestos could explain why 
Green parties win more representation in the EP context.
5.4. Pro-EU Voting
During the 2019 EP elections campaign, Green parties across Europe positioned 
themselves as the party of choice for pro-EU voters. As demonstrated in the Irish and 
Finnish Green Party manifestos, the parties made their support for the EU and continued 
European integration explicitly clear in their campaign materials (Irish Green Party, 2019; 
Vihreät - De Gröna, 2019b). The Greens/European Free Alliance group within the EP has 
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also been one of the most active groups in putting forward proposals to increase participa-
tory democracy in the EU and move away from national vetoes towards a full supranational 
democracy (Sorace, 2019). Importantly, the pro-integration position reflects the priorities 
of Green parties’ core electorate, as Green party voters tend to support the EU more than 
average voters in their countries. Using the belief that “European unification should go 
further” as a proxy for support for the EU and European integration, Table 9 demonstrates 
that respondents who feel closest to their national Green party were far more likely than av-
erage respondents to support further European unification. This disparity was especially pro-
nounced in Ireland, Finland, and Germany, where there were differences of over 10 points.
Table 9. % of ESS Respondents Who Believed That European Unification Should Go Further:  
Total and Among Respondents Who “Feel Closer to” the Green Party





                           Source: ESS Round 8 (2016)
In a post-Brexit Europe facing the rise of far-right Eurosceptic parties in many mem-
ber states, the future of the EU was a hugely salient issue in the 2019 EP elections and may 
have been especially important to Green voters. 25% of all voters in the election ranked 
their support for the EU among their top three reasons for voting, an 11 point increase 
from the 2014 EP election (Zalc et al., 2019). “The way that the EU should be working 
in the future” was listed among the top two issues which motivated 36% of voters to vote 
in the 2019 election, making it the fourth most salient issue in the election, closely behind 
economy and growth (44%), combating climate change (37%), and promoting human rights 
and democracy (37%) (Zalc et al., 2019). Further, 27% of voters in the 2019 EP elections 
said that Brexit, the most prominent manifestation of Eurosceptic sentiment, influenced 
their decision to vote in the election. In contrast, only 17% of non-voters said that Brexit 
influenced their decision, indicating that the media coverage and discussions around Brexit 
encouraged people to vote rather than to abstain (Zalc et al., 2019). Respondents who fin-
ished their education at age 20 or above, were employed in white-collar professions, or who 
believed that their “voice counts” in the EU were more likely to say that Brexit influenced 
their decision. Because these demographics are overrepresented in the Green voter base, it 
is likely that Green voters were more influenced by Brexit than average voters.
6. Conclusion
The success of European Green parties in the 2019 EP election reflects the increased 
salience of issues that must be addressed at a transnational level: environmental policy, cli-
mate change, and EU governance. In this election, ideologically aligned Green voters voted 
according to their “sincere” preference rather than engaging in tactical voting for larger 
mainstream parties as they may have done in previous national elections. Green parties 
were also more explicit about their environmental and pro-EU policies in their EP election 
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manifestos. Finally, Green parties were able to mobilize voters against the threat of Euros-
cepticism in response to Brexit and the growth of far-right politics.
The second-order election dynamic, which has traditionally characterized EP elec-
tions, did not explain Green success in 2019 nor did it consistently explain electoral out-
comes for other parties. Small parties did not always do better in EP elections as compared 
to national elections, and the losses predicted for large governing parties were small or 
nonexistent in several cases. Perhaps the validity of the other hypotheses examined in this 
paper can shed light on the new dynamics of EP elections. The increase in voters’ belief 
that their voice counts in the EU reflects a growing perception that EP elections matter 
and should not be treated as second-order. The salience of specifically “European issues” 
as a motivation for party choice in the 2019 EP election indicates that EP elections are not 
simply a reflection of national politics. Future EP elections will determine whether the first-
order election dynamics of issue salience observed in the 2019 election are the beginning of 
a larger trend or were a one-off effect of heightened EU polarization. However, the Greens' 
outperformance of their national representation certainly suggests that environmental and 
niche party politics are acquiring new relevance in the EU.
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